HDHomeRun 4K is Nextgen TV Certified

[nickk]

So then I guess if the HDHomerun Flex 4K/HD Homerun app doesn’t receive DRM capabilities from A3SA and high noon was to go into effect, all ATSC 3.0 stations, regardless of whether they use DRM encryption or not, would become unwatchable for us?

No. Channels that are not DRM encrypted will always work on the HDHomeRun. This is not something we will compromise on.

[Freekick123]

So then I guess if the HDHomerun Flex 4K/HD Homerun app doesn’t receive DRM capabilities from A3SA and high noon was to go into effect, all ATSC 3.0 stations, regardless of whether they use DRM encryption or not, would become unwatchable for us?

No. Channels that are not DRM encrypted will always work on the HDHomeRun. This is not something we will compromise on.

Question, what if the station lets the security certificate expire? It happens, especially with all the consolidation happening things get lost or ignored. Because it's certified, wouldn't the HDHomeRun be obligated to at least generate a nag screen?

[Cabal]

So then I guess if the HDHomerun Flex 4K/HD Homerun app doesn’t receive DRM capabilities from A3SA and high noon was to go into effect, all ATSC 3.0 stations, regardless of whether they use DRM encryption or not, would become unwatchable for us?

No. Channels that are not DRM encrypted will always work on the HDHomeRun. This is not something we will compromise on.

Question, what if the station lets the security certificate expire? It happens, especially with all the consolidation happening things get lost or ignored. Because it's certified, wouldn't the HDHomeRun be obligated to at least generate a nag screen?

Do channels that do not use DRM employ security certificates? The number of moving parts/implementations here isn't clear to me.

[Freekick123]

No. Channels that are not DRM encrypted will always work on the HDHomeRun. This is not something we will compromise on.

Question, what if the station lets the security certificate expire? It happens, especially with all the consolidation happening things get lost or ignored. Because it's certified, wouldn't the HDHomeRun be obligated to at least generate a nag screen?

Do channels that do not use DRM employ security certificates? The number of moving parts/implementations here isn't clear to me.

Yes, according to the response filed by Weigel in the NextGen docket after their testing, they found that even channels without DRM would put up a nag screen constantly or just not display based on the device with a bad or missing security certificate.

Here's the "high noon" letter from Weigel ICYMI: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/108272632722025/1

[Cabal]

Question, what if the station lets the security certificate expire? It happens, especially with all the consolidation happening things get lost or ignored. Because it's certified, wouldn't the HDHomeRun be obligated to at least generate a nag screen?

Do channels that do not use DRM employ security certificates? The number of moving parts/implementations here isn't clear to me.

Yes, according to the response filed by Weigle in the NextGen docket after their testing, they found that even channels without DRM would put up a nag screen constantly or just not display based on the device with a bad or missing security certificate.

I thought those were channels with misconfigured signing and/or DRM, not channels without DRM entirely. But maybe I misunderstood.

[Freekick123]

Do channels that do not use DRM employ security certificates? The number of moving parts/implementations here isn't clear to me.

Yes, according to the response filed by Weigle in the NextGen docket after their testing, they found that even channels without DRM would put up a nag screen constantly or just not display based on the device with a bad or missing security certificate.

I thought those were channels with misconfigured signing and/or DRM, not channels without DRM entirely. But maybe I misunderstood.

From the letter:
"Weigel recently worked with a leading ATSC 3.0 test lab to simulate how A3SA’s
planned “High Noon” would affect consumers’ ability to receive ATSC 3.0 TV signals. The
results confirmed that signals (including non-DRM content) transmitted without an A3SA-issued
certificate will not be displayed."

[nickk]

Question, what if the station lets the security certificate expire? It happens, especially with all the consolidation happening things get lost or ignored. Because it's certified, wouldn't the HDHomeRun be obligated to at least generate a nag screen?

Weigel observed televisions either displaying a strong warning or failing to play the channel. Unknown what a DVR is "meant" to do in this situation as the user is not around to approve the recording. We are trying to do something about all this.

The whole thing is pointless for non-encrypted channels as the signing does not cover the audio or video. The HDHomeRun will play/record the channel no questions asked.

[danieljlevine]

In theory having such a digital signature is a good thing so you know the broadcast came from the broadcaster. In the past only a few rogue broadcasts have ever happened. I believe Lon mentioned those occurrences. So it is useful from a repudiation standpoint. However, if it’s used to force DRM acceptance or deny access to non-DRM use broadcasts then that needs to be dealt with.

I could see how an attack vector could be to broadcast an emergency with an unsigned transmission, causing unnecessary public panic, when a little warning could help people realize the transmission isn’t from the broadcaster's station.

There are other possible attacks to the stream before the digital signature is applied to it. So it wouldn’t help to identify when an attacker inserts their own audio/video before that digital signature is applied.

Pretty theoretical cases to guard against, I suppose, but also not fully protected either. So using this to justify or support DRM probably is not a positive development.